# Run-time Soft Error Injection and Testing of a Microprocessor using FPGAs

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#### What are Soft Errors (Transient Faults)?

- One time error in circuit
  - i.e. not a permanent structural or functional failure
- Caused by external radiation
  - i.e.cosmic rays,  $\alpha$ -particles, ...
  - Solar flares, EM interference, radiation from packaging or other system components (e.g. Intel's 16 KBit DRAMs from 1978)
- Important when incorrect value is saved in memory (latch)

#### **Motivation**



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- Circuits are getting smaller, faster, more dense (more susceptible)
- Aviation/Space applications (safety critical, more radiation)
- On larger systems they become quite frequent



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- Our Approach and Implementation
- 3 Test Application and Results
- 4 Future Work and Conclusion

## Possible Soft Error Testing Methods



Three main approaches:

- Physical testing
  - Need finished chip and radiation source (for accelerated testing)
- Software injection/emulation
  - Can do it during development, but either slow or restricted
- Hardware accelerated simulation
  - Can be done before production, its fast, but can be limited

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## **Our Approach - Overview**



Goals of the current design:

- Implement and test an entire SoC
  - Current implemention uses a MIPS based SoC
- Run real applications in real time
  - Need GPIO, lots of Memory, RTOS support, ...
- Fast simulation, flexible, and cheap

# **Our Approach - Architecture**



The SoPC contains:

- MIP32 compatible processor (OurMIPS)
- A programmable fault injector (time, location, number, ...)
- Multiple I/O components (GPIO, USB, UART, ...)
- External memory (512KB SRAM, 8MB SDRAM)

## **Our Approach - Architecture**



Our current version of OurMips supports:

- 32 bit MIPSv1 instruction set
- Hardware interrupt support
- Hardware multiply/divide units
- Co-processors (e.g. FP unit) and GPIO support

# **Our Approach - Architecture**



To inject soft errors we currently use shadow registers:

- OurMIPs contains two copies of every register
- Fault location(s) can be shifted in without pausing the processor
- Fault location(s) can be random or specifically selected
- Can easily change from input based to output based fault injection

## **Our Approach - FPGA Based**



We currently use an Altera FPGA starter board:

- Connected to multiple external memory and I/O signals
- Excellent debugging capabilities (Signal Tap, Logic Analyzers, ... )
- Can handle our full SoC (≈40% Utilization, 10's MHz)
- Cheap ( $\approx$ 100 $\in$ ), and getting more capable every year

Scalable: From embedded processors to Sun's OpenSPARC T2

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Our total flow is as follows:

- Program the FPGA with SoPC
- Send the fault injection parameters to the system
- Send the software application to the system
- Initialize and start the fault injector
- Secute the software application
- Monitor the application and compare to error-free run
- Repeat X times

## **Test Application**



We used a Pioneer P3-DX mobile robot:

#### • Scalable and allows us to use multiple sensors

For the results:

• Compared dead reckoning odometry and sonar measurements to ground-truth data (laser range finder) using a Kalman filter



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# Test Application - Software Hardening



IEEE Floating point numbers:

1 bit sign, 8 bit exponent, 23(24) bit significand

Our floating point representations:

- 16 and 32 bit (fx16, fx32)
- Variable size integer and mantissa parts
- Range is more than adequate for our application

		10 Transient Faults/s			100 Transient Faults/s		
Q-Format	Туре	Time (s)	RMSE (m)	# TSF	Time (s)	RMSE (m)	# TSF
IEEE	float	1.731	9.83 <i>E</i> 30	8	1.658	2.07E36	22
Q[4].[28]	fx32	0.441	0.021	3	0.441	0.022	14
Q[7].[25]	fx32	0.487	0.020	2	0.488	0.024	20
Q[10].[22]	fx32	0.558	0.019	2	0.580	0.121	21
Q[13].[19]	fx32	0.595	0.049	2	0.593	1.794	14
Q[4].[12]	fx16	0.349	0.022	1	0.343	0.022	19
Q[7].[9]	fx16	0.300	0.026	0	0.297	0.026	14
Q[10].[6]	fx16	0.257	0.036	1	0.258	0.106	17
Q[13].[3]	fx16	0.230	0.140	0	0.300	0.140	18

- Total of 1,800 simulation runs performed (100/configuration)
  Simulation are fast (< 2 seconds per run)</li>
- IEEE FP calculations are very susceptible to transient faults
- Custom FP representations reduce calculation errors drastically
- Total system failures are rare (unless transient fault count >>> 0)

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## Continuing work



#### Generate data from use in a real application

#### • A ground controlled or autonomous blimp (an UAV)

Filter the IMU (inertial measurement unit) data in real time

• i.e. the data of 3 gyro., 3 accel. and 3 magneto. Measure/monitor the effects on the RTOS

• Is real time always real time?

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#### Conclusion

# Introduced an new architecture to simulate soft errors Fast, flexible, accurate, and cheap

- Architecture allows for real time fault injection
  - Can be used as a simulator, or directly in live test applications
- Provides easy access and insight with debugging tools
  - Every latch can be monitored with embedded logic analyzer
- Overall goal is to increase soft error performance and chip quality
  Designers can compare software/hardware hardening approaches

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